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ANALYSISANDCOMMENT
COMMODITY FORWARD CONTRACT AND REGULATED INVESTMENT
BUSINESS ^ TRADING HOUSES BEWARE
CR SugarTrading Ltd v China National Sugar & Alcohol Group Corp
[2003] EWHC 79 (Comm), English Commercial Court
Facts
This was an appeal by CR against an arbitral award made against them by the Sugar Association of
London.CR alsomade an application for relief under section 5, Financial Services Act1986.
CRwas a physical sugar trader.CSW, the respondents, was a Chinese Government-owned company
which imported raw sugar to be refined for subsequent export. CSW granted CR a series of put
options whereby CR purchased the right to sell quantities of raw sugar to CSW at a very low strike
price.CRpaid very substantial premiums for these p`ut'options.Whenmarketprices fell significantly,
CRexercised their putoptionsbutCSWrefused to takephysical delivery (byrefusing to establish the
relevant letters of credit).CSW argued that the contracts were unenforceable for being in breach of
the Financial Services Act1986.That defence succeeded at arbitration.
The arbitration tribunal held that the contractswere contracts for i`nvestmentbusiness' andbecause
CRwas a company carrying on business in the United Kingdomwithout being authorised under the
Financial Services Act1986 to conduct i`nvestment business', the contracts were unenforceable.
Decision
David Steel J dismissed the application.Themain questionwas whether the put options were in fact
contracts for an investmentpurpose or commercialpurpose ^ the formerwould fallwithin theremit
of the Financial Services Act1986.The latter are unregulated andwould be exempt from the Act.
The relevant parts of the1986 Act define i`nvestment business' as engaging in the business of buying,
selling, subscribing for or underwriting investments or offering or agreeing to do so either as
principal or agent.The critical term i`nvestments' includes:
ö options to acquire or dispose of any investment falling within any other paragraph of Schedule1
to the Act;
ö rights under a contract for the sale of a commodity or the property of any other description
underwhichdelivery is to bemade at a future date and at a price agreeduponwhen the contract
ismade.
It thus followed that both commodity contracts for the future delivery and options to acquire or
dispose of commodities for future delivery are generally within the scope of i`nvestments'. Under
the Statutory Guidance to that Act, a contract is regarded as made for investment purposes if it is
made or traded on a recognised investment exchange or made otherwise than on a recognised
investment exchange but expressed to be as traded on such an exchange or on the same terms as
those on which an equivalent contract would be made on such an exchange. A contract not falling
within the above shall be regarded as made for commercial purposes if under the terms of the
contract, delivery is to be made within seven days.Where a commodity contract does not easily fit
into these criteria, the following shallbe treatedas indications that the contractwas for a commercial
purpose:
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(a) either or each of the parties is a producer for the commodity or other property or uses it in his
business;
(b) the seller delivers or intends to deliver the property or the purchaser takes or intends to take
delivery of it.
The court held that both parties were engaged in the business of purchase and sale of sugar and did
not u`se' sugar in their business. As to whether the seller had intention to deliver the sugar and the
buyer (CSW) had intention to take delivery of it, the court held that at thematerial time (when the
contract wasmade) therewas no intention to deliver or to take delivery of the sugar.
The contracts were therefore caught by the Financial Services Act1986 and could not be enforced.
Comment
Although this case was decided on the basis of the Financial Services Act1986 which has now been
replaced largely by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the lessons which might be drawn
are nonetheless relevant as the new Act had not made significant changes in this context (see the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001).
It is obvious that the ruling in the present case could seriously affect trading houses ^ David Steel J
effectively held that trading houses who merely buy and sell commodities do not u`se' the com-
modities they trade in.The practical implication here is that trading houses could no longer justify
their commodity forward contracts as having been made for commercial purposes simply because
they relied on the physical commodities for the success of their business.The effect of the financial
services regime is very severe. The contract is struck down and there is also the risk of potential
criminal liability.This is thus no light matter for trading houses ^ they really must re-examine their
contractual relationships with their financing banks and customers based around forward contracts.
Traderswho deal in physical goods should not think they are exempt from financial services law;while
it is clearlyopen to them to avoidrisksbyprotectivemeasures such as forward contracts and options,
theymust be careful that thesemeasures could very well be caught by financial services legislation.
This case is also the first reported decision on how the distinction between c`ommercial' and
i`nvestment' purposes in the context of international trade should be made.The key issue, as far as
David Steel J was concerned, was whether one or more of the parties is a producer or uses it in his
business.The issue is not one of law, according to the judge. It is one of fact or construction.The judge
said:
I`n its ordinary meaning, the verb `` to use'' connoted the process of putting into service or consuming
material . . .Thosewho simplybuy and sellmaterial aremore likely to be indulging inmarket speculation
than thosewho produce or consumematerial.'
All this is without controversy generally.However, as to whether the fact that CSW had in the past
imported sugar for refining andresale (known as tollingoperations) could support the argument that
CSW u`sed' the commodity in itsbusiness, the courtheld that itwas notrelevantbecause at the time
the options were granted, CSW had ceased its tolling operations and in any event, the refining
processeswere carried outby thirdparties.This raises a few interesting points.Whilst it is clear that
CR's submission should fail, it is at least open to discussion as towhether tolling operations, had they
not ceased, would havemade an impact on the finding.The court referred to p`utting into service or
consumingmaterial'.Does that connote end-use? Additionally, itmightbe concluded that the court's
outright dismissal of the argument on the basis that the sugar was, in any event, to be refined by a
third party seems to confine the term u`se' to own or personal use, not t`he process of putting into
service or consumingmaterial' involving the agencyof a thirdparty. All in all,we areno closer towhat
u`se' entails, especially in respect of traders seeking to take advantage of the inward (or outward)
processing relief schemes available in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Naturally the court's
approach must largely be dictated by the term u`se' in the Statutory Guidance but perhaps, as far as
the legislator is concerned, a matter of some consideration should be to place greater emphasis on
whether the object of the arrangements was to profit frommarket speculation.
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The second principle to emerge from this case is that in determining whether the parties had
intention to deliver or to take deliveryof the goods, the operative time iswhen the option is granted
and notwhen it is exercised.This part of David Steel J's judgment confirms Guidance ReleaseNo3/88
of the Securities and Investment Boardwhich states:
I`n determining a person's intentions, regardwill certainly be had to any expression of those intentions,
for example, in the contract itself, or whichrelate to a course of dealingsbetween theparties.This does
not mean that the parties can contract out of regulation under the Act; merely that an expression of
their intentions is strong evidence of what those intentions are. In this context it is worthmentioning that
the test of intention applies at the time the contract is made. A subsequent change of intention does not
affect the status of the contract so long as it does not lead to a near agreement or doubts about the
original basis of the original agreement . . .' (emphasis added).
Itmust however be submitted that this too is not an entirely satisfactory test. As in thepresentcase,
the fact was that it was not a simple open and shut case of no intention.The element of intention
could be characterised in this way: the intention was to effect physical delivery if the strike price is
met and the put option is exercised. The parties' intention was thus conditional (on market
conditions). On this issue there was little guidance from the court ^ the position was that as the
tribunal had concluded on the facts that `the parties had persistently left out the possibility of
delivery' and as this was a fact-sensitive issue, the tribunal's findings should not be overturned.
As far as principles are concerned, this case regrettably, though understandably, offers little. It does,
however, highlight quite compellingly the perils of mixing commercial transactions with market
speculative actions for trading houses.
JC
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ^ REINSURANCE ^
PRIVACY/CONFIDENTIALITY ^ ISSUE ESTOPPEL
Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services Ltd v
European Reinsurance Company of Zurich
Privy Council Appeal No 93 of 2001, delivered 29 January 2003, Privy Council,
on appeal from the Court of Appeal of Bermuda
Facts
AEGIS, incorporated in Bermuda, entered into an automatic facultative reinsurance agreementwith
European Re, a Swiss company. AEGISwas a mutual insurance company issuing excess of loss liability
policies to itsmembers, whoweremostlyUSutility companies.Liabilities arisingunder thesepolicies
were reinsuredby European Re.
The agreement contained a comprehensive arbitration agreement which provided for the estab-
lishment of a three-arbitrator tribunal, default appointments, the situs and governing law of the
arbitration agreement. It also provided for equitable arbitration (avoiding the strict letter of the
law), and indicated that procedurewas to be at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal.
Two disputed claims by AEGIS were referred under the agreement to separate arbitrations with
differently constituted tribunals. In the first a set of procedural directions were prepared by the
tribunal and agreed by all involved. They were signed by AEGIS and European Re, and by the
arbitrators.One section of the practice direction addressed c`onfidentiality' and set out a number of
provisions, some general and others particular.The two general provisions provided:
`31.The parties, their lawyers, and the Court of Arbitration agree as a general principle tomaintain the
privacy and confidentiality of the arbitration. In particular they agree that the contents of the briefs or
other documents prepared and filed in the course of this proceeding, as well as the contents of the
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